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AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT
JAMES FENSKE
Abstract. I evaluate the impact of education on polygamy in Africa. Districts of French
West Africa that received more colonial teachers and parts of sub-Saharan Africa that re-
ceived Protestant or Catholic missions have lower polygamy rates in the present. I find no
evidence of a causal effect of modern education on polygamy. Natural experiments that
have expanded education in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Kenya have not reduced
polygamy. Colonial and missionary education, then, have been more powerful sources of
cultural change than the cases of modern schooling I consider.
1. Introduction
Polygamy and poverty are both widespread in Africa.1 Several mechanisms have been
proposed linking polygamy to slow growth, including low savings rates (Tertilt, 2005), re-
duced investment in girls’ human capital (Edlund and Lagerlo¨f, 2006), and diminished labor
supply of unmarried men (Edlund and Lagerlo¨f, 2012). In the “polygamy belt” stretching
from Senegal to Tanzania, it is common for more than one third of married women to be
polygamous (Jacoby, 1995). Excepting Haiti, polygamy is less common in other developing
countries. In all other Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), at least 92% of married
women are reported to be monogamous. This is despite a striking decline in the prevalence
of polygamy in Africa over the last half century. In Benin, more than 60% of women in the
sample used for this study who were married in 1970 are polygamists, while the figure for
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cialists are typically unfamiliar with the term “polygyny.”
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those married in 2000 is under 40%. This is also true of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Senegal.
Several other countries in the data have experienced similar erosions of polygamy. This is
an evolution of marriage markets as dramatic as the rise in divorce in the United States or
the decline of arranged marriage in Japan over the same period.
I use DHS data on 494,157 women from 34 countries to ask two questions. First, does
increasing education reduce polygamy in Africa? Second, does the answer to this question
differ between colonial and modern education? Theories of polygamy exist that suggest it
will disappear as education becomes more prevalent (Gould et al., 2008). Similarly, female
education and monogamy both correlate with general measures of female empowerment
(Doepke et al., 2012); educating women may empower them to pursue more favorable marital
outcomes.
I find that colonial education reduces polygamy. I use historic data from Huillery (2009)
and Nunn (2014a) to show that schooling investments decades ago predict lower polygamy
rates today. Within French West Africa, I show that former colonial districts that had
more teachers per capita during the early colonial period display lower rates of polygamy
today. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of several district characteristics as con-
trols and to basing inference off comparisons of adjacent districts within narrow geographic
neighborhoods. There is only limited evidence that observable characteristics of districts
that predict greater receipt of colonial teachers also predict lower rates of polygamy. Simi-
larly, parts of present-day Africa that are in closer proximity to colonial missions have lower
rates of polygamy in the present. This is robust to several controls, increasingly stringent
geographic fixed effects, different measures of proximity to missions, and comparison with
immediately adjacent areas. There is no evidence that missions were located in areas that
had less polygamy before colonial rule.
In the modern period, there exists a clear negative correlation between a woman’s years
of education and whether she is a polygamist. To test if this is causal, I exploit four nat-
ural experiments that have increased female education in Nigeria (Osili and Long, 2008),
Zimbabwe (Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj, 2014), Sierra Leone (Cannonier and Mocan, 2012), and
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Kenya (Chicoine, 2012). The Nigerian Universal Primary Education (UPE) program ex-
posed specific cohorts of children from certain regions of the country to additional primary
schooling. While Osili and Long (2008) use a difference-in-difference approach to show that
this reduced fertility by age 25, I find no effect on whether women exposed to the program
married polygamously. This is robust to state trends and to discarding Lagos from the anal-
ysis. Instrumental variables estimates using the intervention do not suggest a negative effect
of a woman’s education on her later polygamy.
In Zimbabwe, the end of white rule made higher levels of education available to black
women. Using a regression discontinuity that compares cohorts just young enough to be
treated by this change with their older peers, Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj (2014) show that this
improved their knowledge about HIV. By contrast, I find no effect on polygamy. This result
is robust to changing the width of the window around the cutoff age and discarding cohorts
just around the cutoff. Instrumental variables estimates are insignificant and, at their most
negative, still suggest a causal effect that is smaller than the raw correlation observed in the
data.
In Sierra Leone, a Free Primary Education (FPE) program benefitted certain cohorts and
varied in intensity over space. Cannonier and Mocan (2012) use a difference-in-difference
approach to show that the program changed women’s attitudes towards health and violence
towards women. I find only weak evidence that the program affected polygamy. While my
point estimates are consistently negative, they are insignificant and small in most specifi-
cations. Some robustness exercises suggest a significant negative effect of the program, but
only if variation over space in program intensity is not used for identification. Otherwise,
results are robust to alternative specifications of the control group, controlling for violence
during the civil war, alternative coding of the treatment group, and restricting the sample
to non-migrants.
In Kenya, a reform of the education system during the 1980s lengthened primary school,
leading to an average increase in schooling attainment for affected cohorts. Identifying
treatment effects using nonlinearities in exposure across cohorts, Chicoine (2012) finds that
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the reform led to reduced fertility and delayed marriage. I find no effects on polygamy.
Instrumental variables estimates do not suggest a negative effect of years of schooling on
polygamy. This is robust to restricting the sample of included cohorts, and there are similarly
null effects for placebo cohorts unlikely to have been affected by the reform.
Together, these results suggest that different mechanisms must explain the nonzero effects
of historical education and the null effects of modern education. Changes due to historical
education accrued through the accumulation of benefits and externalities over time and the
pressures for cultural change found in both secular and mission schools. The effects of
modern schooling have been muted by a narrower focus, heterogeneous impacts that lack
reinforcement, and the low quality of contemporary schooling.
1.1. Contribution. My results contribute to our knowledge of the determinants of ethnic
institutions. Institutions such as pre-colonial states and land tenure matter for modern in-
comes (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Although an
empirical literature has explained national institutions as products of influences such as set-
tler mortality, population, trade, or suitability for specific crops, less is known about the
origins of ethnic institutions. Like national institutions, these may have been shaped by geo-
graphic endowments such as ecologically-driven gains from trade, by population pressure, or
by colonization (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Fenske, 2014; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013). I
add to this literature by testing hypotheses about the origin of one specific ethnic institution,
and by identifying variables that influence its persistence and evolution.
My results also add to our understanding of family structures. Several recent contributions
have explained marriage patterns using the gender division of labor created by influences
such as the plough (Alesina et al., 2013), animal husbandry (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013),
natural resource wealth (Ross, 2008), or deep tillage (Carranza, 2014). Other views link
marital rules to risk-sharing arrangements (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Part of this lit-
erature has drawn on economic models, history, and anthropology to discuss the causes of
polygamy, stressing variables such as male inequality (Barber, 2008; Bergstrom, 1994; Betzig,
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1982, 1992, 1995; Kanazawa and Still, 1999), the gender division of labor (Boserup, 1970; Ja-
coby, 1995), political economy (Anderson and Tollison, 1998; De la Croix and Mariani, 2012;
Lagerlo¨f, 2010), the slave trade (Dalton and Leung, 2014; Edlund and Ku, 2011; Thornton,
1983), the gender ratio (Becker, 1974; White and Burton, 1988), land quality (Korn, 2000),
animal husbandry (Adshade and Kaiser, 2008), son-preference (Milazzo, 2014), abundance
of land (Goody, 1973, 1976), assortative matching (Siow, 2006), and fertility preferences
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1986). Another branch of this literature has examined the impli-
cations of polygamy for outcomes such as cooperation (Akresh et al., 2011) or economic
growth (Tertilt, 2005). While many models of polygamy suggest that it benefits women, its
prevalence across countries is negatively correlated with other measures of female empower-
ment (Doepke et al., 2012). In this paper, I uncover a dramatic transition in the continent’s
marriage markets, and assess one plausible explanation for this change.
Finally, I add to a literature that tests the effects of education on female empowerment.
The policy changes I exploit have each been used in previous studies to test whether educating
women shapes their later fertility, health, and beliefs (Agu¨ero and Ramachandran, 2010;
Bhalotra and Clarke, 2013; Cannonier and Mocan, 2012; Chicoine, 2012; Osili and Long,
2008). Other studies have used similar natural experiments or randomized control trials to
test whether educating women improves outcomes for them. In some cases, providing women
with education or skills can have large beneficial effects, even compared to the impacts on
men (Bandiera et al., 2014; Blattman et al., 2014). Many of these studies, however, have
found effects that are weak or heterogeneous (Duflo, 2012; Friedman et al., 2011). This
heterogeneity requires explanation. Although polygamy is a marital outcome for millions
of African women, I am not aware of any study that has attempted to identify a causal
effect of education on polygamy, in either experimental data or through the use of a natural
experiment.
The question of historical persistence cuts across all three of these literatures. A large
literature has recently demonstrated that several past events, investments, and institutions
have had effects that remain visible today (Bruhn and Gallego, 2012; Dell, 2010; Nunn,
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2014b). My results provide an unusual example in which not only does history matter, but
in which it matters more than policy initiatives in the present day.
I introduce the multiple data sources that I use and describe broad patterns of polygamy
and education in section 2. I demonstrate the persistent effects of colonial education in
section 3 and test for effects of modern education in section 4. I discuss the mechanisms
explaining these effects in section 5. In section 6, I conclude.
2. Data
In this section, I introduce my sources of data. I provide additional details in the online
appendix.
2.1. Data sources. Data are taken from the “individual recode” sections of 90 DHS sur-
veys conducted in 34 sub-Saharan countries between 1986 and 2009. These individual-level
samples are nationally representative cross-sections of ever-married women of childbearing
age. From these surveys, 494,157 observations are available in which a woman’s polygamy
status, year of birth, and urban residence are known. A woman is coded as polygamous if she
reports that her husband has more than one wife. Latitude and longitude coordinates of the
respondent’s survey cluster are known for 301,183 of these observations.2 Year of birth, year
of birth squared, age, age squared, dummies for religion, years of schooling, and whether the
woman lives in an urban area are taken from these surveys.
Data on historic education are taken from two existing papers. Teachers per capita and
other controls from colonial French West Africa from Huillery (2009) are available on her
website. Her primary sources are annual local budgets for the period 1910 to 1928. I
average the number of teachers for each district in each year over this period and divide by
the population in 1925 (the year with the fewest missing values). Additional controls that
describe the pre-colonial and geographic characteristics of these districts are also taken from
Huillery (2009, 2011), who describes them in greater detail.
2Recent DHS surveys add noise to these coordinates. Because this displaces 99% of clusters less than 5 km
and keeps them within national boundaries, this adds only measurement error to the geographic controls.
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Locations of colonial missions from Nunn (2014a) (originally from Roome (1924)) are
available on his website. This map reports precise locations and denominations of missions
established by foreign missionaries for indigenous Africans. Distance to a Protestant or
Catholic mission is computed using the latitude and longitude coordinates of the mission
locations and affiliations recorded by Roome (1924) and the coordinates of the respondent’s
survey cluster.
Geographic controls are collected from several sources. For each of these, I assign a survey
cluster the value of the nearest raster point. I obtain suitability for rain-fed agriculture
and ecological zone from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Agro-Ecological
Zones (FAO-GAEZ) project. The ecological zones are dummy variables, while the suitability
measure ranges from 0 to 7. Elevation is an index that ranges from 0 to 255, taken from the
North American Cartographic Information Society. Malaria endemism is from the Malaria
Atlas Project, and ranges from 0 to 1. Ruggedness is the Terrain Ruggedness Index used by
Nunn and Puga (2012), which ranges from 0 to 1,368,318. Absolute latitude and distance
from the coast are computed directly from the cluster’s coordinates.
Two of the natural experiments that I exploit require additional data not in the DHS. I
use three measures of Nigeria’s UPE program from Osili and Long (2008): a dummy for a
“high intensity” state, school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census population
estimates, and school-building funds normalized by (unreliable) 1976 population projections.
These are reprinted in their paper. I follow Osili and Long (2008) in matching respondents
to the Nigerian states that existed in 1976 by matching current states to the historic states
from which they were split off.
In order to assess the effect of the Free Primary Education program in Sierra Leone,
I require the data on district-level primary-school funding and teachers in 2004 used by
Cannonier and Mocan (2012). They have collected this data from the Government of Sierra
Leone Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the financial year 2004,
and have kindly shared it with me in personal correspondence.
Summary statistics are in Table 1.
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Figure 1. Polygamy and education in Africa
This figure plots the mean polygamy rate and years of education of women in each cell.
2.2. The distribution of African polygamy and education over space and time.
I map African polygamy and education in Figure 1. I aggregate the women for whom
coordinates are available to cells that are 0.5 degrees in latitude by 0.5 degrees in longitude.
Darker colors indicate higher rates of polygamy or greater mean years of schooling. Polygamy
is concentrated in West Africa, though a high-intensity belt stretches through to Tanzania.
Polygamy in the data is largely bigamy: 72% of respondents report that they are the only
wife, 19% report that their husband has two wives, 7% report that he has three wives, and
fewer than 2% report that he has 4 wives or more (see Table A1 in the online appendix).
It is clear from Figure 1 that areas with high rates of polygamy are also areas in which
African women have fewer years of education on average. Further, it is clear that there
are correlations across space between polygamy and education that hold within countries.
Southern Ghana, Southern Nigeria, and Southwestern Kenya all stand out as more educated
and less polygamous than other regions in these countries.
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I show the decline of polygamy over time in Figure 2. A raw correlation between year of
birth and polygamy will confound time trends with age effects, since a young lone wife may
later become a polygamist’s senior wife. Thus, I estimate the time trend of polygamy for
each country with more than one cross-section. I use the regression:
Polygamousi = f(Agei) + g(Y earOfBirthi) + i.(1)
The functions f and g are quartic. I use the estimated coefficients and survey weights to
calculate the predicted probability that a woman aged 30 is polygamous as a function of her
year of birth. I present these in Figure 2. Though the speed of the decline has differed across
countries, its presence has been almost universal. In the online appendix, I show raw plots
of polygamy by age stratified by country and survey year: these tell a similar story. To my
knowledge, this is not a trend that has been documented previously.3
3. African Polygamy: Past
3.1. Colonial teachers in French West Africa.
There are 108 districts of French West Africa for which data on both polygamy and
colonial teachers are available. The education system established in French West Africa in
the early twentieth century was intended to provide rudimentary education to the African
masses and a higher level of instruction to a small elite (Gravelle, 2014). Education expanded
slowly, from 2,500 primary pupils in 1900 to 62,300 in 1935, mostly in the first two grades,
and mostly in public schools rather than mission schools (Gardinier, 1980). Expansion
was more rapid after the Second World War, and French West Africa had 381,753 primary
pupils in 1957-8 (Gardinier, 1980). The post-independence political class was educated in
the interwar period in schools such as the William Ponty School in Senegal (Chafer, 2007).
3The data do not permit a similar exercise for men. In the online appendix I also show the evolution of
average years of schooling by birth cohort for the women in the sample.
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Figure 2. Predicted polygamy over time for women aged 30, by year of birth
Time trends show predicted polygamy at age 30 by year of birth, as calculated by estimating (1).
Wary of creating an unemployed anti-colonial intelligentsia, the French limited post-primary
education (Gardinier, 1980).
Schools in French West Africa operated on the French principle of assimilation, teaching in
French and with the French curriculum (Cogneau and Moradi, 2014). Despite post-colonial
reform efforts, most teaching in countries such as Senegal remains in French following a
curriculum in the French style, with funding skewed towards urban areas (Bolt and Bezemer,
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Figure 3. Colonial teachers and modern polygamy in French West Africa
This figure plots mean polygamy in each district of colonial French West Africa against log teachers per
capita.
2009). Madrassas were suppressed by the colonial government (Bleck, 2013). Although the
French were wary of missionary education in the colonies, pragmatic concerns led them to
allow missionary schools to receive state funding alongside state schools (Bolt and Bezemer,
2009). Mission schools that did not comply with government rules, however, were shut down
(Cogneau and Moradi, 2014).
To test whether former districts of French West Africa that received more teachers in the
early colonial period show lower rates of polygamy today, I estimate:
Polygamousij = βTeachersPerCapitaj + x
′
ijγ + ij(2)
Here, Polygamousij is an indicator for whether woman i in former colonial district j is a
polygamist. TeachersPerCapitaj is the average number of teachers per capita in district j
over the period 1910 to 1928. In alternative specifications, I replace TeachersPerCapitaj
with its natural log. xij is a vector of controls that includes a constant, the woman’s year
of birth and its square, dummies for religion and whether the woman lives in an urban area,
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and a quadratic in the woman’s age. Age and year of birth are not collinear, since not all
women are surveyed in the same year. In successive columns, I add controls to xij so that
it matches the controls used by Huillery (2009) as closely as possible. I include measures
of the attractiveness of the district to the French, conditions of its conquest, pre-colonial
conditions, and geographic variables. Standard errors are clustered by 1925 district. I use
the linear probability model throughout this paper, because of my use of fixed effects, my
large sample size, and for simplicity.
In Figure 3, I show the raw correlation between the natural log of colonial teachers and
the polygamy rate across respondents in the sample. There is a clear negative correlation.
I present results of estimating (2) in Table 2. A one standard deviation increase in colonial
education reduces polygamy by roughly 1 percentage point (column 1). In columns (2)
through (5) I add the controls added by Huillery (2009), and in column (6) I add country-
round fixed effects. The result remains robust across columns, and holds whether I use
teachers per capita or its natural log.
In each column I also report Altonji et al. (2005) ratios. These compare the coefficient
without a restricted set of controls βr to the coefficient with a full set of controls βf in
the ratio βf/(βr − βf ); see Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). For example, a large positive
ratio suggests that unobservable variables must have a large effect on β relative to the
observed controls in order to explain away the result. Here, column (1) – no controls – is
the “restricted” set. A negative ratio exists if additional controls make the estimated effect
larger. The ratio is negative or greater than one in all specifications, implying in the first
case that controls actually strengthen the results and in the second case that the influence of
unobserved variables would have to be greater than that of the observed controls to explain
the results.
One benefit of looking only within West Africa is that this removes bias due to the selective
colonization of regions of high education demand by particular colonial powers (Frankema,
2012). In Table A3 in the online appendix, I report a robustness exercise similar to one in
Huillery (2009). I divide French West Africa into squares of equal size and assign districts
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to squares by the latitude and longitude coordinates of the capital city. I then create fixed
effects for these squares. I show that, even restricting identification to comparisons of districts
within the same 1◦ by 1◦ square, districts with more colonial teachers have lower polygamy
rates in the present. The most stringent specification (comparison within 1◦ by 1◦ squares)
assigns 109 districts in the sample across 91 fixed effects.
I also use Table A3 to test whether there is evidence that colonial teachers were stationed
in districts whose pre-determined characteristics predict lower rates of polygamy today. More
teachers per capita existed in districts that collected more trade taxes before colonial rule, in
areas that were conquered earlier and resisted conquest longer, in areas that had a trading
post before colonial rule and were more densely settled at the outset, and in drier areas with
access to the sea. Few of these characteristics, however, predict polygamy. Access to the sea
predicts less polygamy today and average rainfall predicts more polygamy, both of which are
suggestive of positive selection. Their effects are small, however. A one standard deviation
change in either variable predicts a less than one tenth of a standard deviation change in the
mean polygamy rate for a given district. Results survive controlling for these characteristics,
and the other correlates of teachers are uncorrelated with polygamy.
3.2. Missions.
In order to test whether a past history of exposure to Christian missionaries reduces
polygamy in the present, I estimate:
(3) Polygamousij = β ln(Distancej) + x
′
iγ + ij.
Here, Polygamousij is an indicator for whether woman i in survey cluster j is in a polyg-
amous marriage. I also report specifications in which a woman’s years of education is the
dependent variable. Distancej is the distance of her survey cluster from the closest mis-
sion in the Roome (1924) map. I calculate distances separately for Catholic and Protestant
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Figure 4. Colonial missions and modern polygamy
This figure allots the women in the sample into 5km bins based on their distance from the nearest colonial
mission. Each dot plots mean polygamy within a bin against the midpoint of the distance bin.
missions. xij is a vector of individual and geographic controls that includes a constant,
the woman’s year of birth and its square, whether the woman lives in an urban area, and
a quadratic in the woman’s age. I also include several geographic controls: absolute lat-
itude, malaria, suitability for rainfed agriculture, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast,
and dummies for ecological type. In alternative specifications, I will add fixed effects for a
variety of geographic regions. ij is error. Standard errors are clustered by survey cluster.
In figure 4, I show the raw correlation between distance from a mission and polygamy.
I divide the sample into 5km bins classified by distance from a mission, and calculate the
average polygamy rate for each bin. The positive correlation of distance from a mission and
polygamy is clear from the figure. This is also clearly concave, justifying the logarithmic
specification.
I present the results of estimating (3) in Table 3. The results indicate that proximity to
either Catholic or Protestant colonial missions reduces polygamy in the present and raises a
woman’s years of education. Moving left to right across columns, I add geographic controls,
country-round fixed effects, fixed effects and controls together, and geographic controls with
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sub-national “region” fixed effects that approximate provinces. Results are robust across
columns. As in Table 2, I also report Altonji et al. (2005) ratios. With a single exception,
these are greater than one or negative. A one standard deviation increase in access to a
Catholic mission reduces polygamy by roughly 2 percentage points with the tightest fixed
effects (column 12). For Protestant missions (column 16), the standardized effect is approxi-
mately the same. Results are similar if distance from both Catholic and Protestant missions
are entered simultaneously (not reported). Though Nunn (2014a) finds effects of missions
that differ by denomination, he is constrained by the Afrobarometer sampling frame to use
a smaller sample that covers fewer countries.
In the online appendix, I report several robustness exercises. In Table A4, I show that these
results survive controlling for respondent religion. Indeed, the point estimates are largely
unchanged. Although religion may be a channel through which mission exposure reduced
polygamy over the long run, it is by no means a sufficient statistic. I also use this table
to follow Nunn (2014a) by adding additional historical controls that may have influenced
mission placement. In particular, I control for slave exports in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean
slave trade and distance from the nearest route of a nineteenth century European explorer.
The results remain robust.
In Table A5, I report three additional checks. In Panel A, I replace the continuous measure
of distance from a mission with a dummy variable that equals one if the survey cluster is
within 20km of a colonial mission. In Panel B, I keep the same treatment, but restrict my
sample to areas within 40km of a mission. In Panel C, I divide the whole of Africa into
squares of equal size and assign clusters to these squares using their coordinates. I then add
fixed effects for these squares. Even with fixed effects for 1◦ by 1◦ squares (approximately 69
miles by 69 miles), there is a positive correlation between distance from a historic mission
and modern polygamy.
It is still possible that missions were selectively placed in areas where polygamy was least
common. Supporting a causal interpretation, I show in Table A6 that ethnicities recorded
in the Murdock (1967) Ethnographic Atlas that practiced polygamy received more missions
16 JAMES FENSKE
Figure 5. Polygamy by years of schooling
This figure plots mean polygamy for every woman in the sample with a given number of years of schooling
against years of schooling. The fraction of the sample with that level of schooling is also shown.
per unit area. Using the Murdock (1959) map of Africa, I count the number of missions
in the Roome (1924) map that fell within the territory of each ethnic group. I then merge
the ethnic groups in the map to data on polygamy recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas using
the procedure described by Alsan (2015) and Fenske (2014). Regressing the prevalence of
missions on historical polygamy and geographic controls, there is no evidence that missions
were more common where polygamy had been less prevalent before colonial rule.
4. African Polygamy: Present
4.1. Polygamy and own education: Correlations.
I begin by discussing the raw correlation that exists between education and polygamy in
modern data. In Figure 5, I plot the mean polygamy rate for women in my sample against
their years of education, while also showing the fraction of the sample that has each level
of education. Slightly more than half the sample has no education, and the polygamy rate
for this group is nearly 40%. After a sharp decline once any education is achieved, each
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additional year of education correlates with a modest decline in the probability of polygamy,
so that women who have at least 12 years of education have a less than 20% chance of being
polygamous.
This correlation may of course be confounded by omitted variables. I show in Table 4 that
the size of the correlation is quite sensitive to controls. I use OLS to estimate:
(4) Polygamousi = βY earsOfEducationi + x
′
iγ + i.
Here, Polygamousi is an indicator for whether a woman in the sample is polygamous.
Y earsOfEducationi is the number of years of education she has received. In alternative
specifications, I replace this with a binary indicator for whether she has any schooling at all.
xi contains, in alternative specifications, the individual and geographic controls included in
Section 3: a constant, the woman’s year of birth and its square, whether the woman lives in
an urban area, religious dummies, a quadratic in the woman’s age, absolute latitude, malaria,
suitability for rainfed agriculture, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and dummies for
ecological type. I also add, in different specifications, fixed effects for country-round, sub-
national region, and survey cluster. Standard errors are clustered by survey cluster.
This regression does not test for a causal impact of a woman’s years of schooling on
polygamy, but only uncovers the size of the raw correlation in the data. Without controls,
an extra year of schooling appears to have a large correlation with polygamy; one more year
of schooling predicts a 2.4 percentage point reduction in the probability of polygamy. This
shrinks dramatically as controls and fixed effects are added, falling to 0.6 percentage points in
the most conservative specification (column 5). The reduction in probability due to moving
from no education to any education is similarly sensitive to controls and fixed effects. This
is suggestive evidence that unobservable variables explain much of the correlation between
modern education and polygamy, and motivates the use of natural experiments below.
4.2. Polygamy and parental education: Correlations. If historical schools proxy for
parental education, this could help explain the legacies of colonial education found above,
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and the sensitivity of the correlation between polygamy and own education. Because the
DHS data do not report parental education, I test whether there is a correlation between
parental education and polygamy in three West African datasets – the 2010 Nigerian Living
Standards Measurement Study, the first two rounds of the Ghana Living Standards Study
(GLSS, 1986-86) and the Ivory Coast Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS, 1985-
88). On each of these datasets, I use OLS to estimate:
(5) Polygamousi = OwnEducation
′
iα + ParentalEducation
′
iβ + x
′
iγ + δj + i.
Here, Polygamousi is a dummy for whether a woman is a polygamist. OwnEducationi
and ParentalEducationi are vectors that include dummies for own and parental educational
achievement. These vary by country because educational systems vary by country. I collapse
uncommon categories together as “other,” and use “none” as the omitted category. The
controls xi generally include a constant, dummies for year of birth, religion, and survey
round. The fixed effects δj are for the smallest administrative units reported in the data –
clusters in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, Local Government Areas in Nigeria. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of these units.
I show in Table 5 that mother’s education does not predict polygamy in any of these
samples. Daughters of more educated fathers are less likely to be polygamous in Nigeria
and the Ivory Coast, and the negative correlations between own education and polygamy
are large and significant only in the Ivory Coast. Father’s education correlates with reduced
polygamy in the Ivory Coast, but not in Ghana and only uncommon educational categories
of father’s education correlate with a woman’s polygamy in Nigeria.
4.3. Natural experiments. To test whether expanded access to education has reduced
polygamy in Africa, I exploit four recent natural experiments that have exogenously exposed
some cohorts of women to additional education. The original studies that exploited these
policy changes have used them to identify effects on outcomes such as fertility, health, and
beliefs (Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj, 2014; Cannonier and Mocan, 2012; Chicoine, 2012; Osili
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Figure 6. Polygamy and Universal Primary Education in Nigeria
This figure plots mean polygamy for each birth cohort, with the sample separated according to whether Osili
and Long (2008) classify the woman’s state as a “high intensity” or “low intensity” state in the Nigerian
Universal Primary Education (UPE) program.
and Long, 2008). Later studies have validated them by testing for effects of education on
additional outcomes. Bhalotra and Clarke (2013), for example, use three of them to test
whether maternal education reduces maternal mortality.
4.3.1. Universal Primary Education in Nigeria.
The first natural experiment that I exploit comes from Nigeria. Between 1976 and 1981, the
Nigerian government pursued a Universal Primary Education (UPE) program that provided
free primary schooling and increased the supply of classrooms and teacher training initiations
nationwide: see Osili and Long (2008) for details. Importantly, investment was targeted
towards states in the North and Southeast with low levels of pre-program enrollment and
educational inputs. Gross enrollment rates of both boys and girls doubled between 1974 and
1981, and these gains were greatest in states receiving the most new investment.
Osili and Long (2008) use this to test whether female schooling reduces fertility. I use the
same regression specification as Osili and Long (2008), and use OLS to estimate:
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Polygamyi = βTreatmentCohorti × Intensityi
+ αIntensityi + λTreatmentCohorti + x
′
iγ + i(6)
Here, Polygamyi is an indicator for whether woman i is a polygamist. TreatmentCohorti
is a dummy for having been born between 1970 and 1975. Intensityi will, in different
specifications, measure either whether the respondent’s state was treated by the program,
or spending per capita in the state. The controls in xi match Osili and Long (2008). These
are year of birth, dummies for the three largest Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa,
Igbo), and dummies for the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian,
and traditional). The sample includes only women born between 1956-61 and 1970-75. I
follow their approach in limiting the sample to individuals aged 25 and over, although I use
all five available waves of the Nigerian DHS, rather than the 1999 data on its own.4 This
tests whether the UPE program had a differential effect on the women young enough to be
exposed to it as children in the affected states. β is the treatment effect. Standard errors
are clustered by the states that existed in 1976.
Figure 6 shows the identifying variation in the sample. I plot the mean polygamy rate by
birth cohort separately for women from the high and low intensity states. It is clear that the
gap in cohort polygamy rates between the high-intensity states and the low-intensity states is
greater between 1970 and 1975 than between 1956 and 1961. While the education gap closed
between high-intensity and low-intensity states, polygamy rates widened. This foreshadows
the results of estimating (6), reported in Table 6. For two of the three measures of intensity,
exposure to the UPE program increases education but has no effect on polygamy. Using the
less reliable census figures to normalize spending in columns 3 and 6, there is no effect on
either education or polygamy.
4If I restrict the sample to the 1999 DHS, I similarly find no effect of the educational reform on polygamy
(not reported).
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Figure 7. Polygamy and Education in Zimbabwe
This figure plots mean polygamy and mean years of education for each birth cohort in the sample. The
vertical line at 1964.5 separates those young enough to be treated from the remainder of the sample.
I report several robustness checks in the online appendix. In Table A7, I add state-specific
cohort trends, an exercise not performed by Osili and Long (2008). This weakens the effect
of the UPE program on education without eliminating it, and there is still no evidence of
an effect of the program on polygamy. I also use (6) as the first stage of an instrumental
variables specification, in which the first stage dependent variable is years of schooling, the
second stage dependent variable is polygamy, and TreatmentCohorti × Intensityi is the
excluded instrument. There is again no evidence that greater education led to less polygamy
after the UPE program. In Table A8, I show that the results are robust to removing Lagos,
a possible source of migrants whose states of birth might be mis-measured.
4.3.2. The end of white rule in Zimbabwe.
The end of white rule in Zimbabwe promted educational reforms. These removed the
restrictions that prevented black students from progressing to secondary school. Secondary
school enrollment increased immediately and dramatically, and access to education was dis-
continuously increased for black students who were 15 or younger in 1980. Agu¨ero and
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Bharadwaj (2014) examine the impacts of this reform on knowledge of HIV, Agu¨ero and Ra-
machandran (2010) test for intergenerational effects of this education shock, and Bharadwaj
and Grepin (2014) estimate the impacts on child mortality. Following Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj
(2014), I use IV to estimate:
Polygamyi = α + βSi + x
′
iθ + ei(7)
and
Si = β1DumAgei + β2DumAgei × (Age80i − 15)
+ β3(1 −DumAgei) × (Age80i − 15) + x′iθ + i(8)
The outcome of interest in the second stage (7) is Polygamyi. It is an indicator for
whether a woman is polygamous. Si is her years of schooling, and β is the coefficient of
interest. The first-stage equation (8) exploits the discontinuity in exposure based on age in
1980. DumAgei is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a woman was aged 15 or
less in 1980. This is the excluded instrument. Age80i is the woman’s age in 1980, and so
the estimation allows for differential cohort trends on either side of the cutoff. The controls
included in xi in both stages are whether the woman lives in an urban area, dummies for
region, and dummies for DHS round. The two trend variables are included in the second
stage. I follow Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj (2014) and cluster standard errors by the intersection
of region and age in 1980.
Figure 7 shows the identifying variation in the sample, plotting mean years of education
and mean polygamy against cohort, where the vertical line separates treated from untreated
cohorts. It is clear that those who were still young enough to enter secondary school in 1980
discontinuously increased their educational attainment relative to their slightly older peers.
Polygamy rates, by contrast, continue along an almost unbroken trend.
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Figure 8. Polygamy and Free Primary Education in Sierra Leone
This figure plots mean polygamy and mean years of education for each birth cohort in the sample.
This is confirmed in Table 7, which presents OLS and reduced form estimates of (7) and
(8). Treated cohorts gain more than a year’s schooling, but there is no reduction in polygamy.
Instrumental variables estimates confirm this null effect. In Table A9 in the online appendix,
I show that these results are robust to excluding individuals aged 14 and 15 in 1980; this
makes the discontinuity in education more sharp, but has no effect on the insignificant break
in polygamy.
4.3.3. Free Primary Education in Sierra Leone.
Cannonier and Mocan (2012) show that the Free Primary Education (FPE) policy in
Sierra Leone affected women’s attitudes towards issues such as violence and health. The
FPE policy, started in 2001, expanded access to education for all students in schools that
were government-owned or government-assisted. This benefitted younger cohorts, but not
those who were already old enough to have left primary school. Following Cannonier and
Mocan (2012), I estimate:
24 JAMES FENSKE
(9) schoolingijt = β0 + β1FPECohorti +XiΩ + γj + ijt.
Here, the years of schooling of woman i, from district j and born in year t, depends on
whether she was exposed to the program (FPECohorti), controls Xi, and district fixed
effects γj. The FPE cohort consists of those born between 1990 and 1993. The sample
is women born between 1980 and 1985, and between 1990 and 1993. Controls in Xi are
dummies for Christian, Temne, Mende, Urban, Married, Employed, Radio, Fridge, TV, and
Wealth Quintiles. Regressions are weighted using weights from the DHS data, and standard
errors are clustered by district × year of birth. In alternative specifications, I estimate a
reduced-form equation in which schoolingijt is replaced by an indicator for polygamy, and I
use program exposure as an instrument for years of schooling, with polygamy as the outcome.
Alternatively, the effect of the program may vary with its intensity, Rj, suggesting the
regression:
(10) schoolingijt = ϕ0 + ϕ1FPECohorti ×Rj +XiΨ + γj + δt + νijt.
Again following Cannonier and Mocan (2012), Rj is the logarithm of district-level primary
school funding in 2004, divided by the number of teachers and multiplied by 100. The
estimation now includes year of birth fixed effects δt. As before, I also estimate reduced-
form and IV effects on polygamy.
The identifying variation is shown in Figure 8. I plot mean years of schooling and mean
polygamy against birth cohorts. While the mean years of schooling is higher for women in
the treatment cohort than in the control cohort, there is no clear difference in polygamy
rates.
Results are reported in Table 8. I find that, although the FPE program did increase school-
ing attainment, it had no statistically significant impact on the probability that the women
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exposed to the program were polygamous. The instrumental variables estimates, while neg-
ative, are insignificant. They are only large in column (7), which does not use program
spending as a source of exogenous variation in schooling and has a very low Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic, which might indicate a large bias in the estimate. In Table A10 in the On-
line appendix, I report several robustness checks. First, I show that the results look similar
when the control group is replaced with women aged 12 to 16 in 2001. Second, I control for
exposure to the violence of the country’s civil war by assigning each woman in the control
group the number of battle deaths recorded in each respondent’s district in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program’s database. If I do so, a negative effect of the program emerges on
polygamy, but only when I fail to use cross-district variation program spending for identi-
fication. Third, I scale the measures of treatment down by one half for women who were
aged 12 to 14 in 2001, and thus may have only been partly treated by the reform. Again, a
negative effect of the program emerges on polygamy if I only use age to measure treatment.
Finally, I show that the results remain similar if the sample is restricted to women who have
always lived in their current place of residence.
4.3.4. Education reform in Kenya.
A Kenyan education reform in January 1985 lengthened primary school from seven years
to eight. This tended to increase years of schooling for the affected cohorts; students who left
school after primary school now received eight years of education, while those who completed
secondary education now finished with twelve years of school, rather than eleven.
Chicoine (2012) uses this reform to test whether additional schooling reduces fertility for
women. Following his specification, I use instrumental variables to estimate:
(11) Polygamyic = α + βY earsOfEducationic + x
′
icγ + ic.
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Figure 9. Polygamy and Education in Kenya
This figure plots mean polygamy and mean years of education for each birth cohort in the sample.
Here, Polygamyic is an indicator for whether woman i from birth cohort c is a polygamist.
Birth cohorts are defined by both quarter and age, starting at 1 for women born in the
first quarter of 1950. Y earsOfEducationic is woman i’s years of schooling. xic contains a
quadratic in cohort, a cubic in age, dummies for ethnicity, dummies for quarter of birth, and
dummies for childhood region of residence. I cluster standard errors by year of birth and
weight observations using the DHS sample weights. I instrument for Y earsOfEducationic
with a variable, ChicoineInstrumentc, that measures exposure to the educational reform.
It is 0 for cohorts too old to be exposed to the reform (quarters 60 and earlier - i.e. those
born before 1965). It is 1 for cohorts exposed to the full reform (quarters 89 and later - i.e.
those born after 1971). It increases linearly during the transition period between cohorts 60
and 89. The sample includes women born between 1950 and 1980.
Figure 9 depicts the identifying variation in the data. I plot mean education and polygamy
rates against cohorts of birth. It is clear that education increases non-linearly after the reform
is enacted, though at a decreasing rate. The declining trend in polygamy, by contrast, slows
after the reform is enacted. I report results of estimating (11) in Table 9. Although it is
clear that ChicoineInstrumentc predicts education over and above trends in age and birth
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cohort, it has no power to predict polygamy. Instrumental variables results similarly show
no impact of the reform on polygamy.
I report robustness checks in Table A11, in the online appendix. First, I show that the
results are similar if I restrict the sample to women born since 1955. Second, I use two
placebos to show that the reform had no effect on women who were unlikely to have been
affected by the reform; the variable ChicoineInstrumentc does not predict schooling for
women who received less than four years of schooling (quit primary early) or more than 17
years (continued into post-secondary).
5. Discussion
5.1. Colonial education. The results above suggest that histories of colonial and mission-
ary education reduce polygamy in the present, but recent schooling expansions have failed
to have the same effect. Why?
This is not driven by differences in the set of controls used across the different empirical
specifications. I show in Table A12 in the online appendix that using a sparse but consistent
set of controls across specifications does not change the general pattern of results.5
First, the mechanisms for persistence that Huillery (2009) identifies in French West Africa
would have taken years to accumulate: continued use of existing facilities, increased demand
due to positive externalities, and the enhanced political power of educated communities that
could now better lobby for public goods. Further, externalities from colonial education may
similarly have taken time to benefit the descendants of those who were not educated directly
5Because not every variable is available for every subset of the data (e.g. geographic controls are not available
for DHS surveys without GIS data, Nigerian Free Primary Education intensity is only available for Nigeria)
I can only make specifications consistent across tables by controlling for a sparse set of individual controls I
use in the baseline: age, age squared, year of birth, year of birth squared, religion dummies, and urban. I
present results of Tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the appendix using these controls and country-round fixed
effects. I do not include Table 5, since this uses entirely different data sources. I use the same clustering
and samples as in the baseline, though I no longer weight observations in any specification. For the natural
experiments, I include variables that are essential to the identification strategy. For Nigeria, these are the
dummies for “high intensity” and “treatment cohort.” For Zimbabwe, these are the running variables in
year of birth before and after the policy change. For Sierra Leone and Kenya there are no such “essential”
variables. The main results continue to hold: colonial education and colonial missions predict reduced rates
of polygamy, there is a reduced-form correlation between education and polygamy today, but none of the
four natural experiments (in reduced form) predict reductions in polygamy.
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(Wantchekon et al., 2013). Early colonial schools, then, capture not only an individual
woman’s access to education, but also the effects of the access to education experienced
by several generations of her ancestors, both male and female. Indeed, controlling for a
respondent’s years of education in Table 2 weakens the effect of colonial schooling slightly,
but it remains significant in all specifications (not reported). The effect of colonial teachers
on polygamy is already apparent for the oldest cohorts in my sample, and I have found no
evidence that it is diminishing for younger cohorts. Colonial schooling will also have affected
the education of a woman’s peers; I discuss this below in the context of missions.
The content of education has changed since the period of colonial schools and missions.
Colonial administrators believed that Africans should receive instruction with a religious
basis, and so some of the religious messages of mission schools were found in secular edu-
cation (White, 1996). Bolt and Bezemer (2009) characterize colonial education in French
Africa as “a dual church-state educational system” in which missionary schools that followed
the French curriculum could receive state funding. The French colonial state also opposed
polygamy; in Cameroon, for example, it allowed polygamist wives to seek divorce and en-
couraged monogamy (Walker-Said, 2015). Both colonial and missionary education, then,
had effects beyond the simple treatment of providing education. Exposure to the colonial
power and to missions had a long series of effects that reduced polygyny.
Much colonial education came through missions; missionaries educated 97% of pupils
in Ghana and Nigeria during the 1940s, and operated 96% of the schools in South Africa
(Berman, 1974; Nunn, 2014a). Missionaries also made education accessible, bypassing formal
rules and teaching in local languages (Frankema, 2012).
Missionaries taught Christian views on marriage that discouraged polygamy. Although
the degree of missionary intolerance towards polygamy changed over time, missionaries,
particularly Catholics, opposed polygamy as a rule (Falen, 2008). Indeed, prohibition of
polygamy by the Catholic Church has pushed Christian polygamists into African indepen-
dent churches, such as the Cherubim and Seraphim, United Native African, and Apostolic
Churches (McKinney, 1992). For missionaries, the sanctity of Christian marriage was an
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overarching concern (see e.g. Chanock (1985) for Malawi or Phillips et al. (1953) for the
whole of Africa). Kudo (2014) also finds a long-run relationship between missionary activity
and polygamy, specifically within Malawi. He interprets this as a causal effect of religion.
Polygamous marriages, notably, cannot be blessed in a church. Both my results and his
survive controlling for respondent religion, though they are consistent with conversion being
an important channel. That the results are similar for both Catholic and Protestant missions
suggests, however, that religious doctrine is not a complete explanation.
Missionaries put a heavy emphasis on the Bible and on sermons in their schools, and
often had little regard for African customs, actively discouraging tradition (Berman, 1974).
Although culture can be persistent despite outside influences (Nunn, 2012; Voigtla¨nder and
Voth, 2012), the missionary program of social change was broad. Protestant missionaries
translated the Bible into local languages, taught to women and the poor, built voluntary
organizations, brought printing presses and newspapers, taught science, supported secondary
education, encouraged medicine and public health, promoted cash crops, farming techniques,
and industrial and business skills, undermined monopolies, promoted the rule of law, colonial
reforms, and democracy, and protected the property rights of Africans (Cage´ and Rueda,
2014; Woodberry, 2012; Woodberry et al., 2014).
The relationship of Christian missionaries with Islam is also instructive. Islam was a
barrier to the expansion of Christian missions and to the reduction of polygamy. In Northern
Nigeria, the colonial government attempted to discourage Christian missionaries, seeing them
as a threat to the system of indirect rule (Barnes, 1995). Victorian missionaries believed
that Islamic support of polygamy gave it an advantage in Africa (Prasch, 1989). In Malawi,
Islamic ethnic groups were more resistant to the effects of missionary teaching on polygamy
(Kudo, 2014). How missionaries wrote about Islam also indicates their particular concern
with polygamy. Christian missionaries wrote disapprovingly of Islam, citing its support of
polygamy as a point of criticism (Freas, 1998; Hassing, 1977).
Controlling for either the average education or shares of each religion within a respon-
dent’s survey cluster diminishes the effects of missions by roughly half, though they remain
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significant (not reported). This is suggestive evidence that the enduring effects of missions
operate because they affect not only the religious beliefs and education of an individual
woman, but also those of her peers. This effect differs from the four modern natural exper-
iments I exploit, which only treated specific cohorts of women and so are unlikely to have
been strengthened by social reinforcement.
5.2. Modern education. Modern education does not fail to reduce polygamy by failing
to inform students that polygamy is illegal; in each of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya and
Zimbabwe, polygamy is legal in at least some circumstances, such as a marriage under
customary or Islamic law.
Does modern education fail to reduce polygamy because of a different attitude towards
religion than existed in mission or colonial schools? While modern African schools do not
typically have the same religious focus as colonial mission schools, religion is not absent
from modern schools. Schooling in post-independence Africa is heterogeneous. For example,
the school system in Mali today is a mix of “public schools, private, Francophone schools,
madrassas, and community schools” (Bleck and Guindo, 2013). While private schools (in-
cluding religious schools) typically educate a quarter or less of primary students in Africa,
there are some exceptions: notably 88.1% of Zimbabwean primary students were in private
schools in 1999 (Tsimpo and Wodon, 2014).
Despite the secular nature of public (state) schools in many African countries, students
in these schools are taught about religion. This is true, for example, in Tanzania (Dil-
ger, 2013), and in the four countries used for natural experiments. In Nigeria, public (state)
schools are secular, as they were during the oil boom (Abubakre, 1984). Non-vocational elec-
tives include Bible knowledge and Islamic studies (Oluniyi and Olajumoke, 2013). In Zim-
babwe, schools do teach “Religious and Moral Education” with a Christian focus (Marashe
et al., 2009; Mutepfa et al., 2007). In Sierra Leone, some 75% of schools are faith-based
(Nishimuko, 2008), accounting for more than half of enrolment (Wodon and Ying, 2009).
An overwhelming majority of teachers believe religion contributes positively to education
(Nishimuko, 2008). Faith-based schools disproportionately serve poor students and rural
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students (Wodon and Ying, 2009). These religious schools receive government assistance
(World Bank, 2007). In Kenya, government schools are secular; indeed, some schools have
recently prohibited certain items of religious clothing for girls (of State, 2012). As in the
other three cases, religious education does exist in government schools, having been added to
the curriculum in the 1990s (Woolman, 2001). The primary curriculum includes Christian
religious knowledge and Islamic religious knowledge (Bunyi et al., 2011).
It is unlikely that the bulk of the teachers who taught the students affected by the four
natural experiments I use were themselves schooled by missionaries. The exception will be
the earliest case in the data (the Nigerian FPE program), which began sixteen years after
Nigeria’s independence. The changes I exploit in Kenya and Zimbabwe occurred during the
1980s, so that a forty-year-old teacher would have received primary schooling under colonial
rule but during the post-1945 expansion of non-missionary schooling that occurred in most
colonies (Cogneau and Moradi, 2014). The change in Sierra Leone comes even later.
The lack of an impact for modern education is similar to the finding in Friedman et al.
(2011) that educating women does not necessarily create “modern” attitudes. One explana-
tion of the null results I find is that we should not expect a single measure of empowerment
(education) to affect a broad spectrum of outcomes without specifying a specific theory link-
ing them. A woman’s marriage and fertility decisions, for example, may be made on the
basis of several distinct factors, only some of which are affected by education (e.g. Duflo
et al. (2012)). Education may have conflicting effects. For example, schooling may increase a
woman’s distaste for polygamy but also reduce her desired fertility, increasing her husband’s
incentives to take an additional wife (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1986). The natural experiments
that I exploit have found that additional education affected women, but have often failed
to find that the characteristics of their husbands changed as a result. In Zimbabwe, Agu¨ero
and Bharadwaj (2014) do find that women exposed to additional treatment did marry more
educated husbands, but that this is accounted for by the country’s educational reform also
affecting men. In Kenya, Chicoine (2012) finds no effect on the age of a treated woman’s
husband or his level of education.
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A related explanation for the lack of an effect of modern schooling interventions is that
the supposed link between female education and empowerment has generally been overstated
due to omitted variables bias. Duflo (2012), for example, cautions that many studies on the
impacts of women’s education have not accounted for endogeneity; studies that do account
for it may find, for example, that educating women does not improve the health of their
children or has no greater effect than educating men (Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Chou et al.,
2010). My results, then, are not atypical.
Further, the effects of education may be heterogeneous, only affecting marital outcomes
for a subset of the population and under certain conditions. The impact of education may
be limited by other conservative social norms (e.g. Field et al. (2010)), by other ethnic
institutions (e.g. Ashraf et al. (2014)), or by the need for complementary changes in the
incentives facing men (e.g. Gould et al. (2008, 2012)).
Another possible explanation of the negligible effects of modern schooling expansions is
the low quality of schooling in contemporary Africa. Although I am able to find effects of
each of the four natural experiments on literacy (not reported), increased enrollment may
have reduced quality by stretching resources more thinly (Chicoine, 2012). Modern curricula
in Africa are less demanding than those under colonial rule (e.g Bleck and Guindo (2013)).
If an additional year of schooling does not translate into much real education, it may not be
expected to have a large effects on a woman’s opportunities (Pritchett, 2001).
The literature on teacher characteristics in the four countries under study shows teachers
to be, on average, under-motivated and under-trained. In Nigeria, many of the students
entering teacher training during the 1970s were motivated by free training and the difficulty
of being dismissed (Nwagwu, 1981). In 1971, 31% of primary and secondary school teachers
in Nigeria were not professionally qualified to each (Nwagwu, 1977). In Zimbabwe, secondary
school teachers often lack training, skills, experience, or even formal schooling (Nyagura and
Reece, 1990). In the Nyagura and Reece (1990) sample, the average age of teachers in rural
day schools was under 24 years.
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In Kenya, teachers are hired mostly through the Ministry of Education (Duflo et al., 2015).
Hiring is also nepotistic; one third of contract teacher positions in the Duflo et al. (2015)
sample were given to relatives of existing teachers. The civil service teachers in their sample
were two thirds female with an average age of 42. Teacher absence is common (Duflo et al.,
2011). During the 1970s, more than a third of Kenyan teachers were untrained, while today
almost all are trained, though their subject knowledge is poor (Bunyi et al., 2011).
In Sierra Leone, primary school teachers are roughly 30% female (World Bank, 2007).
Some 40% of primary teachers teach at a higher level than appropriate given their qual-
ifications, partly due to the departure of qualified teachers during the war (World Bank,
2007). Many teachers are unmotivated due to low salaries (Nishimuko, 2007). Teachers in
the Nishimuko (2007) sample frequently had secondary jobs, and 80% had at least five years
of experience.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that reduced polygamy rates are a legacy of colonial education
in Africa, but that recent expansions of education have had no effect on polygamy rates.
Women in the former districts of colonial French West Africa that received more teachers
before 1928 are less likely to be polygamous today, as are women who currently reside closer to
the locations of Catholic and Protestant missions in 1925. Policy changes from Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Kenya, and Zimbabwe that have created natural experiments increasing educational
access for some women have not, by contrast, reduced the probability of polygamy for these
same women.
These results suggest that ethnic institutions are shaped by history, as are family struc-
tures in developing countries. Knowing this, however, does not translate easily into policy.
Increasing education in the present is not a perfect substitute for a long history of education,
and both the content and quality of education in present-day Africa differ from what was
provided by colonial schools and missions. Similarly, education is not a sufficient statistic
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for female empowerment; the effects of expanding educational access to women are heteroge-
neous across women and vary by the outcome measured. The effects of education on fertility
and polygamy need not move in the same direction.
Of course, this study does have limitations. There is little data available on heterogeneity
across missions or colonial schools that could be used to better illuminate the mechanisms
behind their long-run effects. Similarly, I am not aware of other data that would allow the
legacies of non-missionary colonial education to be estimated for the rest of Africa. The
natural experiments from the modern period are, by construction, very specific events. Each
reform differed in which parts of the schooling distribution were shifted. Each comes from
a former British colony. All four have yielded similar results, but future research will be
needed to demonstrate whether the response of polygamy to education is the same after
other educational reforms in other contexts.
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Mean s.d. Min. Max. N
Main controls
Polygamous 0.28 0.45 0 1 494,157
Resp. Education Years 3.27 4.06 0 26 493,829
Age 30.8 8.70 10 64 494,157
Urban 0.30 0.46 0 1 494,157
Year of birth 1,969 10.5 1,936 1,994 494,157
Religion: Animist 0.0071 0.084 0 1 494,157
Religion: Catholic 0.17 0.37 0 1 494,157
Religion: Christian (Other) 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157
Religion: Missing 0.093 0.29 0 1 494,157
Religion: None 0.044 0.21 0 1 494,157
Religion: Orthodox 0.016 0.12 0 1 494,157
Religion: Other 0.096 0.29 0 1 494,157
Religion: Protestant 0.19 0.39 0 1 494,157
Religion: Spiritual 0.0036 0.060 0 1 494,157
Religion: Traditional 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157
Religion: Muslim (excluded) 0.34 0.47 0 1 494,157
Ecological zones
Woodland 0.22 0.42 0 1 301,183
Forest 0.061 0.24 0 1 301,183
Mosaics 0.15 0.35 0 1 301,183
Cropland 0.12 0.33 0 1 301,183
Intensive cropland 0.0011 0.033 0 1 301,183
Wetland 0.0084 0.091 0 1 301,183
Desert/Bare 0.034 0.18 0 1 301,183
Water/Coastal fringe 0.041 0.20 0 1 301,183
Urban 0.0070 0.083 0 1 301,183
Other GIS controls
Malaria 0.38 0.19 0 0.75 301,183
Elevation 165 10.3 140 195 301,183
Ruggedness 64,238 102,520 0 1.37e+06 301,183
Distance to coast 463 358 0.013 1,771 301,183
Abs. latitude 10.7 5.18 0.0015 28.7 301,183
Rainfed ag. suit. 3.95 2.08 1 8 301,183
Distance to Catholic Mission 0.21 0.20 0.00015 1.17 301,183
Distance to Protestant Mission 0.17 0.19 0.00010 1.22 301,183
Table 1. Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teachers/capita, 1910-1928 -7.227*** -5.148*** -9.192*** -9.206*** -4.163** -5.314***
(1.314) (1.820) (2.245) (3.234) (1.972) (1.017)
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
AET N/A 2.476 -4.676 -4.652 1.359 2.779
Other controls None Attractiveness Conquest Precolonial H-Geographic Country-Round FE
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln (Teachers/capita, 1910-1928) -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
AET N/A -4.430 -2.694 -3.637 -4.752 14.94
Other controls None Attractiveness Conquest Precolonial H-Geographic Country-Round FE
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using OLS. Attractiveness controls are trade taxes in 1914.
Conquest controls are date of conquest, length of resistence and its square, and indemnities in 1910. Precolonial controls are the presence of an ancient state,
the presence of a European trade counter, and 1925 population density. H-Geographic controls are latitude, longitude, altitude, dummies for the river and coast,
and average rainfall from 1915 to 1975.
Table 2. Colonial education in French West Africa
Dependent variable: Polygamous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Distance from Catholic Mission -0.419*** -0.913*** -0.293*** -0.307***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Observations 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002
AET N/A -1.848 2.336 2.747
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Distance from Protestant Mission -0.709*** -0.893*** -0.394*** -0.399***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002
AET N/A -4.860 1.248 1.289
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln Distance from Catholic Mission 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -4.053 2.277 1.801
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Ln Distance from Protestant Mission 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -35.08 0.945 1.125
Other controls Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
Fixed Effects None Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 3. Missions
Dependent variable: Years of Education
Dependent variable: Years of Education
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using OLS. Geographic controls
(Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to
coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, age, age squared, and urban.
Religious dummies are not included in the controls.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Full sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Resp. Education Years -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 493,829 493,829 493,829 493,829 493,829
Other controls None Indiv. Indiv. Indiv. Indiv.
Sample with geographic controls (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Resp. Education Years -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002
Other controls Geog. Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Indiv.
Full sample (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Any Education -0.201*** -0.121*** -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 493,829 493,829 493,829 493,829 493,829
Other controls None Indiv. Indiv. Indiv. Indiv.
Sample with geographic controls (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Any Education -0.188*** -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.062*** -0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002 301,002
Other controls Geog. Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Geog./Indiv. Indiv.
Fixed Effects None None Cntry-rnd Region Cluster
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Table 4. The conditional correlation between education and polygamy
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using OLS. Geographic controls
(Geog.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast,
and ecological zone. Individual controls (Indiv.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared,
and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Own education
MSLC 0.13 -0.014 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016)
Other 0.036 -0.002 -0.003
Mother's education (0.024) (0.026)
MSLC 0.019 0.020 0.030
(0.034) (0.035)
Other 0.0081 0.036 0.040
Father's education (0.067) (0.069)
MSLC 0.11 -0.021 -0.022
(0.015) (0.015)
Other 0.030 -0.002 -0.010
(0.029) (0.029)
Observations 3,821 3,821 3,821 3,821
Controls and F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Means
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own education
CEPE 0.047 -0.120*** -0.112***
(0.026) (0.026)
Other 0.038 -0.149*** -0.134***
Mother's education (0.030) (0.030)
Any 0.0058 -0.053 0.021
Father's education (0.055) (0.053)
Any 0.046 -0.096*** -0.060**
(0.024) (0.024)
Observations 6,924 6,786 6,815 6,785
Controls and F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Other controls in
the GLSS sample are dummies for religion, year of birth, survey round, and survey
cluster. Other controls in the ICLSS sample are dummies for religion of husband, year
of birth, survey round, and survey cluster. Other controls in the NLSS sample are
dummies for urban, religion, year of birth and Local Government Area (LGA). In all
specifications, "none" is the excluded education category.
Table 5A. Parental education in three West African samples
GLSS
Dependent variable: Polygamous
ICLSS
Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Own education
Other 0.0059 -0.073 -0.074
(0.122) (0.130)
Post-Secondary 0.071 -0.036 -0.038
(0.104) (0.107)
Primary/Some Primary 0.41 -0.023 -0.031
(0.097) (0.100)
Quaranic 0.15 0.015 0.007
(0.096) (0.101)
Secondary/Some Secondary 0.36 -0.045 -0.047
Mother's education (0.099) (0.102)
Other 0.034 -0.027 0.021
(0.037) (0.038)
Primary/Some Primary 0.094 -0.017 -0.000
(0.022) (0.021)
Quaranic 0.20 -0.046 -0.040
Father's education (0.037) (0.052)
Other 0.066 -0.076*** -0.065**
(0.027) (0.029)
Primary/Some Primary 0.13 -0.011 -0.021
(0.021) (0.021)
Quaranic 0.22 -0.032 -0.062
(0.032) (0.053)
Observations 2,727 4,828 4,851 2,637
Controls and F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering LGA LGA LGA LGA
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Other controls in
the GLSS sample are dummies for religion, year of birth, survey round, and survey
cluster. Other controls in the ICLSS sample are dummies for religion of husband, year
of birth, survey round, and survey cluster. Other controls in the NLSS sample are
dummies for urban, religion, year of birth and Local Government Area (LGA). In all
specifications, "none" is the excluded education category.
Table 5B. Parental education in three West African samples
NLSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 0.933** 0.008** -0.041 0.026 -0.000 -0.011
(0.411) (0.003) (0.180) (0.037) (0.000) (0.008)
Born 1970-75 -0.216 -0.225 0.664 -0.010 0.016 0.029
(0.409) (0.391) (0.468) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026)
Intensity -1.903 -0.003 0.609*** -0.010 -0.000 -0.018**
(1.151) (0.005) (0.152) (0.066) (0.000) (0.008)
Observations 15,166 15,166 15,166 15,179 15,179 15,179
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State
Dep. Var.: Years of Education
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the
three largest Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian,
and traditional). 
Table 6. UPE in Nigeria
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 15 or less in 1980 1.167*** 1.054*** 1.172*** 0.008 -0.000 -0.005
(0.198) (0.211) (0.245) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
Observations 6,268 5,260 4,460 6,272 5,264 4,464
Ages in 1980 8 to 21 9 to 20 10 to 19 8 to 21 9 to 20 10 to 19
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region
(7) (8) (9)
Years of education 0.006 -0.001 -0.005
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023)
Observations 6,268 5,260 4,460
Ages in 1980 8 to 21 9 to 20 10 to 19
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region
KP-F 35.18 22.85 21.39
Table 7. Zimbabwe
Dep. Var.: PolygamousDep. Var.: Years of Education (OLS)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results are estimated using OLS. Other controls are urban,
dummies for region, and dummies for DHS round, and differential trends in Age in 1980 on either side of the cutoff.
Dep. Var.: Polygamous (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FPE Cohort 0.523** -0.045
(0.239) (0.050)
FPE X R 0.705*** 0.654*** -0.002 -0.019
(0.204) (0.238) (0.073) (0.074)
Observations 2,659 2,659 2,721 1,613 1,613 1,648
Other controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Fixed Effects District District + Y.O.B. District + Y.O.B. District District + Y.O.B. District + Y.O.B.
Clustering Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District
(7) (8) (9)
Years of schooling -0.105 -0.002 -0.020
(0.115) (0.093) (0.077)
Observations 1,611 1,611 1,646
Other controls Yes Yes No
Fixed Effects District District + Y.O.B. District + Y.O.B.
Clustering Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District
KP Wald 3.937 6.821 9.044
Table 8. Free Primary Education (FPE) in Sierra Leone
OLS
Dep. Var: Schooling Dep. Var: Polygamous
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by birth-year X district. The FPE cohort consists is those born between
1990 and 1993. The sample is women born between 1980 and 1985, and between 1990 and 1993. R is the logarithm of district-level primary
school funding in 2004, divided by the number of teachers and multiplied by 100. Regressions are weighted using weights from the DHS data.
Other controls  are dummies for Christian, Temne, Mende, Urban, Married, Employed, Radio, Fridge, TV, and Wealth Quintiles.
IV
Dep. Var: Polygamous
Dep. Var.: Years of 
Education
(1) (2) (3)
Chicoine Instrument 0.657*** 0.016
(0.175) (0.016)
Years of education 0.032
(0.034)
Observations 29,270 19,611 19,603
Estimator OLS OLS IV
Sample Born 1950 to 1980 Born 1950 to 1980 Born 1950 to 1980
KP-F 7.944
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Year of birth Year of birth Year of birth
Table 9. Kenya
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Other controls are quadratic in
cohort, a cubic in age, dummies for ethnicity, dummies for quarter of birth, and dummies for childhood
region of residence.
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Online appendix. Not for publication.
AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT 55
Appendix A. Data appendix
A.1. Principal DHS data. The principal data source for this study is the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) data, downloaded from http://www.measuredhs.com/. The
main data are the “individual recodes,” which are nationally representative samples of ever-
married women between the ages of 15 and 64 for each country.
I use 90 of these datasets for the analysis. These include data from 34 countries. The full
list of datasets used is reported in Table A2.
The data include 494,157 observations for which data on polygamy are non-missing. Of
these observations, latitude/longitude coordinates are available for 301,183 in separate files
similarly downloaded from the DHS website. These coordinates are used to join the data to
the other variables listed below. Variables used from the DHS data are:
Respondent’s year of birth is the difference between the survey year (v007) and the re-
spondent’s age (v012). The survey year required cleaning: adding 1900 if it was less than
100, recoding 1900 as 2000, 1901 as 2001, and, for Ethiopia, recoding 1992 as 2000 and 1997
as 2000.
Urban is an indicator for whether v025 is “urban.” If v025 was not asked, v102 was used.
Polygamous is an indicator for whether v505 is greater than 0 if v505 is not missing and
is not 98.
Years of schooling is variable v133.
Religion is variable v130.
A.2. FAO-GAEZ data. All of these data are downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.
at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm. The variables that I create are:
Suitability for rain-fed agriculture is plate 46 from the FAO GAEZ data, and measures
the suitability for rain-fed agriculture of any type.
Constraints on rain-fed agriculture is plate 28 from the FAO GAEZ data, and measures
the sum of soil terrain, slope, and climate constraints on rain-fed agriculture.
Ecological zone dummies are computed from plate 55 of the FAO GAEZ data.
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A.3. Other geographic controls. Absolute latitude is the absolute value of the survey
cluster’s latitude, as reported in the DHS data.
Distance to coast is calculated using the globdist command in Stata, after merging the
survey clusters with a pixelated map of the African coast.
Elevation is average elevation for the ethnic group. Raster data are available at http:
//www.naturalearthdata.com/, and are provided by the North American Cartographic
Information Society.
Ruggedness is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2012). This
measures the elevation distance between a raster cell and its neighbors at a fine level. The
data are downloaded from http://diegopuga.org/data/.
Malaria endemism is an index of the degree to which malaria is endemic, according to the
Malaria Atlas Project, downloaded from http://www.map.ox.ac.uk/data/.
A.4. Ethnographic variables. The Ethnographic Atlas can be downloaded from:
eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/
EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
There are several reasons why not all observations could be matched between the DHS
data and this source. Ethnicity is only reported for a sub-sample of the DHS data, and
some of these entries contain uninformative responses such as “other” or “African.” Not
all ethnic groups in Africa have entries in the Ethnographic Atlas, and not all ethnic groups
with entries in the Ethnographic Atlas have data on the historic gender division of labor or
historic class stratification.
Usual polygyny records whether V9 is 3, 4, 5, or 6.
A.5. Data taken from other papers. Three measures of program intensity are taken
directly from the text of Osili and Long (2008) – a dummy variable for a “high intensity”
state, school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census population estimates, and
school-building funds normalized by 1976 population projections based on the (unreliable)
1963 census.
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These variables used to replicate Huillery (2009) are downloaded from http://econ.
sciences-po.fr/elise-huillery. Because population is not available every year, the
denominator for the per capita measures is population in 1925.
58 JAMES FENSKE
Figure 10. Predicted education over time for women aged 30, by year of birth
Time trends show mean education by year of birth, for women aged above 25.
Appendix B. Mean education over time for women above 25 years old, by
year of birth
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Appendix C. Mean polygamy by age, survey round, and country
Figure 11. Means and lowess trends, Part 1
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Figure 12. Means and lowess trends, Part 2
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Figure 13. Means and lowess trends, Part 3
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Figure 14. Means and lowess trends, Part 4
Freq Percent Freq Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 354,019 (71.98) 49,636 (40.49)
2 92,003 (18.71) 58,680 (47.87)
3 34,272 (6.97) 10,959 (8.94)
4 8,428 (1.71) 2,469 (2.01)
5 1,980 (0.40) 488 (0.40)
6 578 (0.12) 181 (0.15)
7 205 (0.04) 67 (0.05)
8 131 (0.03) 38 (0.03)
9 70 (0.01) 29 (0.02)
10 47 (0.01) 22 (0.02)
Total 491,850 122,586
Notes:  Values above 10 not reported
Table A1. The distribution of polygamy
Husband's number of wives Respondent's rank (if polygamous)
Country First survey year Dataset Country First survey year Dataset
Benin 1996 BJIR31FL.DTA Mozambique 1997 MZIR31FL.DTA
Benin 2001 BJIR41FL.DTA Mozambique 2003 MZIR41FL.DTA
Benin 2006 BJIR51FL.DTA Mozambique 2009 MZIR51FL.DTA
Burkina Faso 1992 BFIR21FL.DTA Namibia 1992 NMIR21FL.DTA
Burkina Faso 1998 BFIR31FL.DTA Namibia 2000 NMIR41FL.DTA
Burkina Faso 2003 BFIR43FL.DTA Namibia 2006 NMIR51FL.DTA
Burundi 1987 BUIR01FL.DTA Niger 1992 NIIR22FL.DTA
CAR 1994 CFIR31FL.DTA Niger 1998 NIIR31FL.DTA
Cameroon 1991 CMIR22FL.DTA Niger 2006 NIIR51FL.DTA
Cameroon 1998 CMIR31FL.DTA Nigeria 1986 OSIR01FL.DTA
Cameroon 2004 CMIR44FL.DTA Nigeria 1990 NGIR21FL.DTA
Chad 1996 TDIR31FL.DTA Nigeria 1999 NGIR41FL.DTA
Chad 2004 TDIR41FL.DTA Nigeria 2003 NGIR4BFL.DTA
Comoros 1996 KMIR32FL.DTA Nigeria 2008 NGIR51FL.DTA
Congo-Brazzaville 2005 CGIR51FL.DTA Rwanda 1992 RWIR21FL.DTA
DRC 2007 CDIR50FL.DTA Rwanda 2000 RWIR41FL.DTA
Ethiopia 2000 ETIR41FL.DTA Rwanda 2005 RWIR53FL.DTA
Ethiopia 2005 ETIR51FL.DTA Senegal 1986 SNIR02FL.DTA
Gabon 2000 GAIR41FL.DTA Senegal 1992 SNIR21FL.DTA
Ghana 1988 GHIR02FL.DTA Senegal 1997 SNIR32FL.DTA
Ghana 1993 GHIR31FL.DTA Senegal 2005 SNIR4HFL.DTA
Ghana 1998 GHIR41FL.DTA Sierra Leone 2008 SLIR51FL.DTA
Ghana 2003 GHIR4AFL.DTA South Africa 1998 ZAIR31FL.DTA
Ghana 2008 GHIR5HFL.DTA Sudan 1989 SDIR02FL.DTA
Guinea 1999 GNIR41FL.DTA Swaziland 2006 SZIR51FL.DTA
Guinea 2005 GNIR52FL.DTA Tanzania 1991 TZIR21FL.DTA
Ivory Coast 1994 CIIR35FL.DTA Tanzania 1996 TZIR3AFL.DTA
Ivory Coast 1998 CIIR3AFL.DTA Tanzania 2003 TZIR4AFL.DTA
Ivory Coast 2005 CIIR50FL.DTA Tanzania 2004 TZIR4IFL.DTA
Kenya 1988 KEIR03FL.DTA Tanzania 2007 TZIR51FL.DTA
Kenya 1993 KEIR33FL.DTA Togo 1988 TGIR01FL.DTA
Kenya 1998 KEIR3AFL.DTA Togo 1998 TGIR31FL.DTA
Kenya 2003 KEIR41FL.DTA Uganda 1988 UGIR01FL.DTA
Kenya 2008 KEIR51FL.DTA Uganda 1995 UGIR33FL.DTA
Liberia 1986 LBIR01FL.DTA Uganda 2000 UGIR41FL.DTA
Liberia 2006 LBIR51FL.DTA Uganda 2006 UGIR51FL.DTA
Madagascar 1992 MDIR21FL.DTA Zambia 1992 ZMIR21FL.DTA
Madagascar 1997 MDIR31FL.DTA Zambia 1996 ZMIR31FL.DTA
Madagascar 2003 MDIR41FL.DTA Zambia 2001 ZMIR42FL.DTA
Madagascar 2008 MDIR51FL.DTA Zambia 2007 ZMIR51FL.DTA
Malawi 1992 MWIR22FL.DTA Zimbabwe 1994 ZWIR31FL.DTA
Malawi 2000 MWIR41FL.DTA Zimbabwe 1999 ZWIR42FL.DTA
Malawi 2004 MWIR4CFL.DTA Zimbabwe 2005 ZWIR51FL.DTA
Mali 1987 MLIR01FL.DTA
Mali 1995 MLIR32FL.DTA
Mali 2001 MLIR41FL.DTA
Mali 2006 MLIR52FL.DTA
Table A2. List of individual recodes
     Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teachers/capita, 1910-1928 -4.792** -4.424** -4.108** -7.745*** -7.569***
(2.023) (1.809) (1.635) (1.487) (1.431)
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
Square Size 1 X 1 2 X 2 3 X 3 4 X 4 5 X 5
Other controls None None None None None
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln (Teachers/capita, 1910-1928) -0.030** -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.037***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
Square Size 1 X 1 2 X 2 3 X 3 4 X 4 5 X 5
Other controls None None None None None
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
     Panel B (11) (12) (13) (14)
Beginning of the colonial conquest -0.369***
(0.118)
Number of years of resistance -0.532*
(0.276)
Duration of resistance sqrd. 0.329
(0.230)
Indemnities 1910 0.120*
(0.064)
Trade taxes 1914 0.587***
(0.133)
Kingdom -0.051
(0.075)
Trading post 0.528***
(0.078)
Pop. density 1910 0.162**
(0.072)
Latitude of district's main city -0.460***
(0.125)
Longitude of district's main city -0.160
(0.109)
Indicator of access to the sea 0.570***
(0.112)
Indicator of a navigable river -0.080
(0.081)
Altitude -0.043
(0.080)
Rainfall -0.581***
(0.146)
Observations 108 108 108 108
R-Squared 0.345 0.197 0.411 0.480
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using OLS. Panel A: This is estimated at the individual
level and includes fixed effects for the latitude-longitude squares indicated in each column. Panel B: This is estimated at the district level, and
standardized coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are used in Panel B.
Table A3. Robustness: Colonial education in French West Africa
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Ln (Teachers/capita, 1910-1928)
 Panel A. Add religion dummies (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Distance from Catholic Mission 0.016*** 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -2.000 9.040 14.74
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Distance from Protestant Mission 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.008*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -1.723 2.487 -16.81
 Panel A. Add historical controls (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln Distance from Catholic Mission 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 300,242 301,183 300,242 300,242
AET N/A -3.081 2.885 2.809
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Ln Distance from Protestant Mission 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 300,242 301,183 300,242 300,242
AET N/A -7.309 0.870 1.543
Other controls Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
Fixed Effects None Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using ordinary least squares.
Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness,
elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, age, age
squared, and urban. Religious dummies are also included in the controls.
Table A4. Robustness: Missions conditional on respondent religion
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
 Panel A. Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catholic Mission within 20km -0.053*** -0.073*** -0.029*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -3.750 1.219 0.797
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Protestant Mission within 20km -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.048*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
AET N/A -5.332 1.737 0.989
 Panel B. Within 40km
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Catholic Mission within 20km -0.018*** -0.028*** -0.010** -0.013***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 62,680 62,680 62,680 62,680
AET N/A -2.708 1.494 3.118
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Protestant Mission within 20km -0.020*** -0.057*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 100,098 100,098 100,098 100,098
AET N/A -1.524 -4.945 -4.500
Other controls Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
Fixed Effects None Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Region
Panel C. Full Sample (17) (18) (19) (20)
Ln Distance from Catholic Mission 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
Fixed Effects 1X1 2X2 3X3 4X4
(21) (22) (23) (24)
Ln Distance from Protestant Mission 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 301,183 301,183 301,183 301,183
Fixed Effects 1X1 2X2 3X3 4X4
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using ordinary least squares.
Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness,
elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, age,
age squared, and urban. Religious dummies are not included in the controls.
Table A5. Robustness: Missions with distance bands and matching
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any polygamy 0.515*** 0.174 0.311** -0.075
(0.150) (0.142) (0.136) (0.147)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Any polygamy 1.382*** 1.027 0.869* 0.089
(0.391) (0.714) (0.429) (0.680)
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Usual polygamy 0.153 -0.058 0.360*** 0.154
(0.257) (0.282) (0.115) (0.160)
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Usual polygamy -0.405 -0.296 0.500 0.241
(0.697) (0.424) (0.375) (0.406)
Observations 517 517 517 517
Controls No Yes No Yes
Clustering Region Region Region Region
Table A6. Robustness: Missions and pre-colonial polygamy
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All results estimated using
ordinary least squares. Controls are constraints on agriculture, distance from coast, elevation, malaria
prevalence, precipitation, temperature, distance from Lake Victoria, date of observation, crop dummies,
river, ruggedness, and slave trade distances.
Dependent variable: Catholic Missions
Dependent variable: Catholic Missions 
per unit area
Dependent variable: Protestant 
Missions
Dependent variable: Protestant 
Missions per unit area
Dependent variable: Catholic Missions
Dependent variable: Catholic Missions 
per unit area
Dependent variable: Protestant 
Missions
Dependent variable: Protestant 
Missions per unit area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 1.288* 0.014** -0.021 0.009 0.000 0.034*
(0.615) (0.005) (0.221) (0.045) (0.000) (0.017)
Born 1970-75 -0.357 -0.545 0.729 -0.011 -0.030 -0.069**
(0.465) (0.441) (0.578) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029)
Intensity -35.295 1.638** 54.712 0.000 0.007 5.551**
(87.174) (0.736) (32.627) (0.000) (0.060) (1.984)
Observations 15,166 15,166 15,166 15,179 15,179 15,179
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long
Fixed Effects None None None None None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State
(7) (8) (9)
Years of education 0.027 -0.004 0.249
(0.038) (0.028) (1.040)
Born 1970-75 -0.002 0.017 -0.136
(0.030) (0.027) (0.636)
Intensity 0.043 -0.000 -0.170
(0.107) (0.000) (0.598)
Observations 15,166 15,166 15,166
Cragg-Donald F 22.92 35.76 0.653
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long
Fixed Effects None None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State
Dep. Var.: Years of Education
Table A7. Robustness: UPE in Nigeria. State trends and instrumental variables
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the
three largest Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian,
and traditional). 
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Panel A: OLS with state trends
Panel B: IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 0.419 0.006** 0.456*** 0.022 -0.000 -0.005
(0.367) (0.003) (0.152) (0.060) (0.000) (0.015)
Born 1970-75 0.235 0.025 -0.100 -0.011 0.010 0.015
(0.412) (0.334) (0.422) (0.055) (0.034) (0.032)
Intensity -0.077 0.000 0.237 -0.103 -0.000 -0.012
(0.468) (0.003) (0.182) (0.074) (0.000) (0.019)
Observations 14,302 14,302 14,302 14,313 14,313 14,313
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop.
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long
Fixed Effects None None None None None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the
three largest Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian,
and traditional). 
Table A8. Robustness: UPE in Nigeria. No Lagos.
Dep. Var.: Years of Education Dep. Var.: Polygamous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 15 or less in 1980 1.591*** 1.519*** 1.682*** -0.001 -0.008 -0.019
(0.237) (0.277) (0.327) (0.022) (0.025) (0.032)
Observations 5,504 4,496 3,696 5,508 4,500 3,700
Ages in 1980 8 to 21 9 to 20 10 to 19 8 to 21 9 to 20 10 to 19
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region Cohort X Region
Table A9. Zimbabwe without ages 14 and 15
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Other controls are urban, dummies for region, and dummies for DHS round, and
differential trends in Age in 1980 on either side of the cutoff. All results estimated using ordinary least squares.
Dep. Var.: Years of Education
Panel A. Alternative control groups
FPE Cohort -0.282 0.012
(0.202) (0.046)
FPE X R 0.834*** 0.829*** 0.004 -0.001
(0.211) (0.262) (0.062) (0.066)
Observations 2,167 2,167 2,223 921 921 941
Panel B. Control for battle deaths
FPE Cohort 0.593*** -0.113**
(0.214) (0.050)
FPE X R 0.710*** 0.705*** -0.021 -0.032
(0.201) (0.249) (0.081) (0.081)
Observations 7,205 7,205 7,360 5,140 5,140 5,241
Panel C. Half treatment
FPE Cohort 0.626*** -0.095*
(0.211) (0.051)
FPE X R 0.731*** 0.716*** -0.022 -0.032
(0.205) (0.251) (0.081) (0.081)
Observations 7,205 7,205 7,360 5,140 5,140 5,241
Panel D. Sample of non-movers
FPE Cohort 0.972*** -0.090
(0.237) (0.063)
FPE X R 0.482* 0.667** 0.056 0.060
(0.265) (0.290) (0.085) (0.086)
Observations 3,372 3,372 3,435 2,363 2,363 2,406
Other controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Fixed Effects District District + Y.O.B. District + Y.O.B. District District + Y.O.B. District + Y.O.B.
Clustering Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by birth-year X district. The FPE cohort consists is those
born between 1990 and 1993. The sample is women born between 1980 and 1985, and between 1990 and 1993. R is the logarithm of
district-level primary school funding in 2004, divided by the number of teachers and multiplied by 100. Regressions are weighted using
weights from the DHS data. Other controls are dummies for Christian, Temne, Mende, Urban, Married, Employed, Radio, Fridge, TV,
and Wealth Quintiles.
Table A10. Robustness: Free Primary Education (FPE) in Sierra Leone
Schooling Polygamous
Dep. Var.: Years of 
Education
(1) (2) (3)
     Panel A. Born since 1955
Chicoine Instrument 0.370* 0.029
(0.196) (0.018)
Years of education 0.165
(0.263)
Observations 27,044 17,807 17,801
     Panel B. Less than 4 years schooling
Chicoine Instrument 0.110 0.031
(0.172) (0.038)
Years of education 0.119
(0.174)
Observations 7,679 6,025 6,025
     Panel C. More than 17years schooling
Chicoine Instrument 0.600 -0.056
(0.647) (0.091)
Years of education -0.079
(0.307)
Observations 290 203 195
Estimator OLS OLS IV
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Year of birth Year of birth Year of birth
Table A11. Robustness. Kenya
Dep. Var.: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Other controls are quadratic in cohort,
a cubic in age, dummies for ethnicity, dummies for quarter of birth, and dummies for childhood region of
residence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RHS Variable -5.317*** -0.022*** 0.017*** 0.012***
(1.019) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 103,432 103,432 301,183 301,183
RHS Variable Teachers/cap Log teachers per capita
Ln Distance from 
Catholic Mission
Ln Distance from 
Protestant Mission
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 Cluster Cluster
Compare to Table 1 Table 1 Table 2 Table 2
(5) (6) (7) (8)
RHS Variable -0.011*** -0.070*** 0.046 0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.036) (0.000)
Observations 493,829 493,829 15,115 15,115
RHS Variable Resp. Education Years Any education
Born 1970-75 X 
Intensity
Born 1970-75 X 
Intensity
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Compare to Table 4 Table 4 Table 6, Col 1 Table 6, Col 2
(9) (10) (11) (12)
RHS Variable -0.014 0.014 0.009 0.003
(0.008) (0.024) (0.027) (0.032)
Observations 15,115 6,267 5,259 4,460
RHS Variable
Born 1970-75 X 
Intensity
Age 15 or less in 1980 Age 15 or less in 1980 Age 15 or less in 1980
Clustering Cluster Region X age Region X age Region X age
Compare to Table 6, Col 3 Table 7, Col 1 Table 7, Col 2 Table 7, Col 3
(13) (14) (15)
RHS Variable -0.052 -0.024 0.029*
(0.137) (0.049) (0.017)
Observations 1,641 1,641 19,596
RHS Variable FPE Cohort FPE X R Chicoine Instrument
Clustering Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B. x District Y.O.B.
Compare to Table 8, Col 1 Table 8, Col 2 Table 9
Other controls Individual Individual Individual
Fixed Effects Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd
Table A12. Consistent Controls
Dependent variable: Polygamy
Dependent variable: Years of Education
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year
of birth squared, age, age squared, religious dummies, and urban. Other controls are "High Intensity" and "Treated
Cohort" for Nigeria, and running variables in age for Zimbabwe.
